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Although the importance of property rights as the engine of growth remains 
beyond dispute, this article tries to show that the crucial issue is not so much the 
definition of the allegedly ‘optimal’ property right system, as the understanding of the 
ideological elements that justify property rights in the first place – entrepreneurship and 
self-responsibility. Unless one clearly perceives the nature of the ideological structure 
that legitimises the rules of the game in a given society, it is virtually impossible to 
understand why growth-conducive property-right systems fail to emerge and be 
accepted.  
Put differently, property rights are certainly necessary for growth. But they are 
no tools for policy-making. Getting them right – or transferring them from other 
contexts - is not enough, especially if their assignment and enforcement remains a top-
down process, whereby local politicians or international technocrats suggest and enforce 
institutional arrangements experienced elsewhere.  
                                                 
∗ I am grateful to Pierre Perrin, Simon Teitel and to the participants at the Seminar in Austrian Economics 
at the Faculté d’Economie Appliquée (Université d’Aix-Marseille III) for their insightful comments on a 
previous draft of this paper.  
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On the notion of economics 
Modern economic analysis is usually conceived in two different ways. Some believe 
that economists should study how given policy goals can be attained. In particular, 
when mutually inconsistent objectives are proposed, social scientists should describe the 
implicit trade-offs and suggest solutions, possibly by referring to targets of a higher 
order. The main actors are thus the policy maker, who defines the objectives, and the 
social engineer, who designs the course of action consistent with the assigned target. 
Contrary to this widely shared (mainstream) view, the subjectivist school claims 
that all social sciences should be dealing with the way individuals behave and interact in 
order to pursue their own aspirations. The search for a social goal should thus be 
ignored, for it would necessarily be based on arbitrary utilitarian hypotheses, thereby 
leading to useless or even harmful results. In particular, (free-market) economists 
should focus on the analysis of human conduct in the presence of scarcity constraints, 
whereby individuals have to choose what to sacrifice in order to meet their preferences 
or - more precisely - to increase their satisfaction.  
The differences between these two views have important consequences from the 
moral, positive and normative standpoints. They also define the different roles of 
property rights within the context of growth and development. The first part of this 
work is thus devoted to recalling the ethical validation of a society based on private 
property rights principles and draws some implications for growth and development 
policies from a free-market perspective. By contrast, the second part focuses on the 
discretionary nature of the property rights systems associated with the orthodox views, 
be such views a matter of central planning or of technocratic design. Although the 
importance of property rights as the engine of growth remains beyond dispute, most of 
this article tries to show that the crucial issue is not so much the definition of the 
allegedly ‘optimal’ property right system, as the understanding of the ideological 
elements that justify property rights in the first place. Thus, unless one clearly perceives 
the nature of the ideological structure that legitimises the rules of the game in a given 
society, it is virtually impossible to understand why growth-conducive property right 
systems fail to emerge and be accepted. Put differently, property rights are certainly 
necessary for growth. However, getting them right is not enough.  
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Morality, rules and policy-making in free-market economics 
Morality is probably the key concept. It is usually understood as a set of behavioural 
rules consistent with the ethical standards shared by the large majority of the individuals 
forming a community. Therefore, morality changes over time and across communities 
and defines the patterns of social cooperation
1. For instance, today torture or capital 
punishment are morally unacceptable by most people in Western Europe, but under 
given circumstances they are deemed appropriate in other parts of the world. Similarly, 
in many countries breach of contract on the workplace is often standard practice if 
committed by the employee, but it becomes immoral if committed by the employer. 
Tolerance with respect to theft or fraud is also highly variable across countries and 
across time. 
  Indeed, one can probably maintain that such sets of shared subjective values 
define the communities themselves. From a historical perspective, that was actually the 
case in much of Europe for a very long time – say, at least until the XVIth century. Until 
then, individuals were first of all Christians (and also Orthodox, Catholics, Reformed), 
Muslims, Pagans, Jews, etc. Political boundaries were porous and had little to do with 
national belonging, fatherland and special bonds to countrymen. Loyalty to a ruler was 
based on the prevailing Christian morality, which prescribed little more than vague 
obedience to an élite designated by divine power to administer justice and possibly 
provide protection against external attacks, too
2.  
It is manifest that this approach to morality does not imply any obligation for the 
individual, who should then be free to pursue his own preferences as long as he does not 
opt for violence
3 in order to limit other people’s freedom to choose. Of course, agents 
                                                 
1 Of related interest are the notions of fairness and justice, which differ according to the legitimacy of the 
action involved. In the Judaeo-Christian tradition ‘just’ (i.e. legitimate) denotes an action that respects the 
fundamental principle of equal human dignity, which can be considered as a synonymous of individual 
freedom. On the other hand, fairness reflects the individual evaluation of others’ behaviour, which can be 
approved or disapproved irrespective of its legitimacy. Unfortunately, the distinction between fairness 
and justice has become blurred in modern democracies, where the notion of ‘legitimate’ has been 
replaced by the concept of ‘legal’; legal now being what the majority believes to be fair. 
2 Many authors, from the XVIIth century (Hobbes) until today (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) have tried to 
develop the notion of ‘social contract’. All their efforts, however, shared the same purpose, i.e. to replace 
a divine contract with a secular one. As underscored in Hoppe (2001), they all ended up by offering a 
reason for the monopoly of state power to exercise violence and by justifying the very existence of the 
state in the absence of divine legitimacy.   
3 That includes both physical and non physical violence (e.g. fraud and deception).   
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do not necessarily operate in a society without rules. But such rules do not need a 
forced-upon, pre-defined moral framework
4. On the other hand, they require compliance 
with the principles of human dignity, which cannot be separated from the notion of 
private property rights; and from man’s right to subdue nature. These are at the core of 
what is usually known as Western Culture. Hence, the sacredness of individual freedom, 
the duty to accept individual responsibility and the inviolability of property rights both 
over the fruits of one’s own labour and efforts and over natural resources not previously 
appropriated by others. Given these fundamentals, which are rooted in the so-called 
natural law, all other rules that discipline human action should be the result of an 
explicit contract, whereby individuals voluntarily accept to restrict their behaviour, if 
they wish to do so.  
Contrary to the orthodox approach, where morality is a set of collective goals 
defined through a process of democratic selection, the moral fundamentals of free-
market economics set severe limits to political action, since in this latter case the 
politician cannot interfere with individual liberty and property rights. He can only 
protect and enforce them; and looses legitimacy when his behaviour is at odds with the 
natural order
5.  
One can thus conclude that the issues of development and growth
6 in a free-
market context in fact are non-issues, for development is hampered whenever the 
institutional framework restricts economic freedom. Similarly, growth is simply a 
matter of personal choice, for it reflects the desire to sacrifice leisure and engage in 
                                                 
4 This is an open issue among subjectivists. The Austrian School (Mises) suggests that one should not try 
to persuade another individual to accept moral standards other than those spontaneously developed by 
himself. By contrast, Economic Personalism maintains that non-violent calls for moral reform are 
perfectly legitimate, as long as private property is not questioned. See on this Beaulier and Prychitko 
(2001). 
5 See also Hoppe (this volume). 
6 Despite strong criticism by several Austrian economists (see for instance Rothbard 1963 and Batemarco 
1987), the literature defines growth as an increase in aggregate purchasing power, as described by GDP 
and income statistics, with some adjustments. The term development may take two meanings. It can 
denote the improvement of a number of aggregate variables that reflect collective well-being, such as per 
capita GDP, life expectancy, literacy, health conditions, caloric intake, unemployment, infrastructure. 
Distribution of these variables across the population is also considered, so that homogeneity implicitly 
turns out to another important element of development. However, the word ‘development’ can also 
denote the range of opportunities open to the individual, where the word ‘opportunities’ refers to the 
ability to satisfy preferences and the returns of one’s own efforts and investments. The former definition 
is typical of the orthodox view and is usually described by the so-called ‘Social Development Index’ 
(United Nations/WHO), whereas the latter is typical of the free-market view and described by the ‘Index 
of Economic Freedom’ (Heritage Foundation).  
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productive activities, given the opportunities available. Surely, there is no need for 
growth strategies, development policies or grand projects of any kind, but only for an 
appreciation of the protection and enforcement of property rights in a given institutional 
framework (which is far from being an easy task, anyway).  
Put differently, from the free-market standpoint an undeveloped country is one 
where property rights are not enforced. Per-capita GDP plays a role only because this 
variable is often correlated with the lack of economic freedom. Thus, it provides a clue 
as for where property rights are more likely to be violated. And inequalities play no role 
at all, either; unless they originate from arbitrary rules of the game being imposed upon 
various layers of the population according to religion, race, tribal origin, gender, 
passport, etc.. 
 
Property rights and orthodox development economics 
As hinted in the preceding paragraphs, the moral foundations of mainstream economics 
are not based on subjectivism. Instead, good or bad orthodox policies are defined 
according to their perceived ability to attain shared goals, rather than to enhance 
individual preferences. Not surprisingly, economists then turn to statistics, or devote 
their energies to studying political expediency and pragmatism, so as to develop recipes 
for effective policy making and methods to maximise consensus. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the repeated efforts to transform economics into a hard science have 
transformed many scholars into instruments serving a very soft discipline – politics in 
redistributive democracies. Property rights structures are thus a tool of policy-making. 
As a result, they become subject to political or technocratic discretion when it comes to 
their definition, their assignment or re-assignment, their enforcement. Mainstream 
development economics is no exception. 
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Substituting planning for private property rights 
Two distinct periods have characterised traditional post-WWII development 
economics
7. The first coincided with widespread planning ambitions and dominated 
until the early Seventies, possibly a little longer. Despite the disappointing results of 
pervasive state intervention in the 1930s, both the academic community and public 
opinion were impressed by the alleged economic successes of the Soviet bloc and eager 
to reproduce at least some features of the central-planning process. In particular, private 
property would be accepted, but considered to be subject to aims and principles of a 
higher order. Even today, the same principle would apply to situations where 
individuals exchanging property rights are not able or willing to take into account the 
full implication of their decisions. Of course, this falls short of perfection and can be 
interpreted as an economic inefficiency. But since this is always the case in any human 
activity, assessing when such inefficiencies are intolerable has become a matter of 
discretionary evaluation by the policy-maker, the legislator, the judiciary.  
The undeveloped world turned out to be an almost ideal target for greenfield 
experiments in economic policy. In some cases development economics focused on how 
property rights were to be re-defined and transferred to the state, i.e. to politicians and 
various layers of the bureaucracy. In other cases property rights were weakened and 
made subject to arbitrary intervention by the state, rather than transferred. By and large, 
however, the assignment, exchange and enforcement of property rights were designed in 
order to suit political priorities, rather than individual economic needs and preferences.  
Not surprisingly, all efforts to reproduce Western or even Soviet economic 
results failed miserably. In most cases, centralised investment policies and easy credit 
led to cathedrals in the desert, capital outflows and ultimately heavy debt. Similarly, 
educational policies led to elite schools for the top politicians, bureaucrats and their 
                                                 
7 The birth of development economics coincides with the downfall of the Western colonial empires and 
the ascent of the role played by the mass media. In particular, economic events in many former colonies 
became of international political interest, Western politicians and bureaucrats perceived new 
opportunities to satisfy their quest for power, honours and prestige, Western public opinion became more 
exposed to the many tragedies taking place in previously unknown parts of the world.  
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clients
8. Whereas technological transfer actually meant well-remunerated jobs for 
international professionals and bureaucrats, to be paid by international agencies.  
Surely, property rights were not entirely destroyed. The tragedy of the commons 
as traditionally understood was not necessarily a distinctive feature of the undeveloped 
areas. Rather, rights were de facto appropriated by the political class and subsequently 
reassigned, sometimes for limited periods of time, sometimes with no guarantee of 
enforcement. In many situations this explains the frequent outbreaks of violence, as 
competing pressure groups tried to appropriate and enforce rights on the resources; or to 
influence their assignment by the political élites and thus acquire some kind of 
legitimacy vis-à-vis third parties, including the international community. 
 
From planning to technocratic utopia 
Different editions of the neoclassical paradigm have dominated the second period of 
orthodox development economics. They all tried to provide explanations for the failures 
of the previous decades and they all shared the view that property-right assignments 
were a matter of technocratic intervention. According to a naive version, economic 
backwardness was attributed to bad policy-making, due to poorly qualified decision-
makers. Consistent with this view, most recipes aimed at (i) providing expert economic 
advice and/or a justification to carry out allegedly good economic policy even if resisted 
by public opinion
9, (ii) offering financial support in order to enhance political 
feasibility, i.e. to reduce the cost of transforming a rent-seeking society into a free-
market economy, (iii) providing financing and know-how so as to realize adequate 
infrastructure and public goods, without which a market economy cannot work 
properly, (iv) introducing democratic political institutions. These measures have not 
made a great difference to the economies of the undeveloped world. Most of them 
remained poor. Indeed, many countries that did well in the 1970s and the 1980s 
followed other avenues and would hardly figure among the suitable case studies for 
neoclassical textbooks.  
                                                 
8 As recently argued by Carneiro and Heckman (2003), the quality of human capital depends more on the 
ability to provide motivation and enhance an adequate family environment, rather than on policies to 
favour education directly.  
9 This is generally known as the ‘shield effect’ (Vaubel, 1992), and is also typical of many developed 
countries, where it often protects bad policy makers from domestic criticism.  
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After having suffered from severe criticism, this naïve version has gradually 
been integrated by another set of prescriptions and has been gradually transformed into 
a new story, whereby the influence of the institutional school of thought is apparent. It 
argues that growth and development are indeed a matter of appropriate institutions 
(rules of the game), and that the quality of institutions ultimately depends on the 
definition, exchange and enforcement of property rights. Hence, new development 
policies are focused on the creation of a system of political rules and organisations that 
replicates - by and large - those currently in place in the developed world. The 
importance of property rights is now fully acknowledged. Still, its assignment and 
enforcement remains a top-down process, whereby a local politician or an international 
technocrat suggests and enforces the most suitable institutional arrangements
10. As will 
be discussed at length shortly, this represents a crucial weakness and seriously 
undermines the traditional property-rights view of economic development.  
 
Where do we stand? 
There is little doubt that the institutional commitment shown by much of the orthodox 
economic profession is not going very far. Under these circumstances, private property 
is not the foundation of human dignity and societal interaction, but rather a tool for 
policy making. Indeed much of the debate in the recent past has concentrated on 
defining the extent to which (private) property can be violated, what kind of rules of the 
higher order are needed in order to limit discretion, how such rules can be enforced. 
Similarly, a considerable part of the ‘political economy’ literature has been devoted to 
explaining which constitutional project stands the best chances to reduce political 
instability, social tensions (if not civil war), misbehaviour and discretion by bureaucrats 
and policy-makers (e.g. corruption). Similarly, hundreds of experts spend their time in 
teaching the virtues of market economics and fair income distribution.  
In fact, failures have been caused neither by ignorance about the virtues of 
property rights economics, nor by the boundless and brutal greed of shortsighted but 
rational autocrats with an interest in crushing opportunities for development. There is no 
doubt that the persistent failure to grow owes a great deal to poor rules of the game and 
                                                 
10 This is the essence of the of the so-called political economy approach, as opposed to the institutional 
school, which emphasises the importance of a bottom-up process. See for instance Pejovich (2003).  
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unsatisfactory property-right arrangements. But at least equally important is the 
interaction between deeply rooted informal institutions, old cultural traits, new and 
possibly disruptive ideological features. Enforcing property rights from outside will not 
do. For the outlook for growth will remain gloomy as long as the ability to create and 
seize opportunities for self-enhancement is being hampered. In other words, it is here 
maintained (1) that property rights cannot be imposed by fiat, (2) that in order to 
understand what kind of property rights structure is likely to develop and whether that is 
conducive to growth one must understand the dominant ideological features of a society 
and (3) that the ideological traits relevant for the birth of private property rights systems 
cum growth are entrepreneurship and self-responsibility. These should not be taken for 
granted too easily and will now be analysed in greater detail.  
 
The origins of desirable evolutionary patterns 
Two key notions identify the origins of success in the fight among competing 
civilisations. They are the principles of entrepreneurship and of individual 
responsibility, upon which both geography and ideology have played important roles. In 
particular, growth depends on the willingness and ability of the individual to act, take 
responsibility for his own actions and possibly break new ground (entrepreneurial 
behaviour)
11. Clearly specified and enforced property rights - private property rights in 
particular - are of course also necessary. But without entrepreneurship and self-
responsibility property rights per se do not generate growth. An ideological or cultural 
environment hostile to individual responsibility means that individuals are reluctant 
both to develop new knowledge and to take advantage of their talents, irrespective of 
the potential for high monetary rewards. Furthermore, such an environment tends to 
discourage outsiders, who may indeed be willing to take responsibilities, but are afraid 
                                                 
11 See also Holcombe (2001). Self-responsibility and entrepreneurship are of course two different 
concepts. The former refers to the full recognition of the consequences of individual behaviour, while the 
latter refers to the ability to develop new ideas and possibly bear the risk of failure. This holds true when 
talking about the individual. Still, when analysing the behaviour of a community for an extended period 
of time, a social environment where entrepreneurship is frowned upon is not likely to encourage self-
responsibility. For example, when envy-led behaviour turns out to be morally acceptable, 
entrepreneurship is likely to be devoted to redistributive (rent-seeking) activities, rather than to the 
creation of wealth. Thus, if one ignores the entrepreneurial nature of the rent-seekers, it is plausible to 
claim that the ethics of (productive) entrepreneurship and that of self-responsibility go together. This is 
indeed the view taken in this text, where the notions of entrepreneurship and self-responsibility in a social 
context are used almost interchangeably.  
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that free riders or rent-seekers would be morally justified in interfering, if not explicitly 
encouraged to do so. Stagnation and poverty are the obvious results. 
By considering development also as a matter of individual responsibility one is 
then led to ask why some communities are bound to accept responsibilities more easily 
than others. Or why some societies just reject any form of responsibility, except for very 
limited ambits, like the family. This is where geography and ideology may play a 
significant role. Of course, there is no such thing as an optimal geographical setting, or 
an ideal moral standard. They are both highly variable concepts. Individuals move and 
look for suitable locations to develop and satisfy their aspirations, as the history of 
migrations shows. Potentially rich lands, such as today’s USA or Argentina, have 
followed entirely different economic paths and generated further puzzles for economic 
determinism. Similarly, ideologies that may seem beneficial to growth under given 
circumstances turn out to be obsolete and even counterproductive in contexts where the 
notion of legitimacy is subject to interpretation and interference by special interest.  
Accidents obviously play an important role, too. However, by looking at 
accidents through neo-institutional lenses one would not go very far, other than 
describing the different paths that can develop within a civilisation, as shown for 
instance by De Long and Shleifer (1992). As discussed elsewhere (2003), according to 
the new institutional school an accident is the starting point of a path-dependent process, 
whereby the rules of the game develop according to a mix of rent-seeking dynamics and 
technological events. Although it would be hard to deny this statement, this view ends 
up by explaining evolution by referring to unexplained accidents. That is hardly 
acceptable as a theory. 
  By building on the new-institutional notion of accident, however, modern 
development economics justifies the introduction of new property-right systems as some 
kind of favourable accident, after which new promising growth patterns can emerge, 
perhaps thanks to individual successful ‘path-finders’ that induce imitators to follow 
(Pejovich, 2003). Surely, the assignment and enforcement of property rights and - more 
generally - the legitimacy of ownership would enhance capital formation and be the 
clear solution to the development problem, as recently suggested, for instance, in De 
Soto (2000). But the very problem of development is to understand why the legitimacy  
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of private property tends not to be accepted, that is why the hoped-for accident is so 
unlikely to occur. 
 
Demography and property rights 
As regards geography, its effects on growth seem to depend on the response to 
demographic pressure (North and Thomas, 1973) and the need and opportunity to trade 
(Bauer, 1991). Population growth is assumed to have promoted Western growth in 
different ways. Demographic pressure forced people to migrate towards less populated 
areas. Distance made it more difficult for the central authorities to control individuals 
and thus use violence in order to extract rents. As a result, private property rights were 
easier to protect against external interference and economic activity was encouraged. 
Furthermore, individuals living in wide-apart areas would be settled in territories 
featuring different geological and climatic conditions. This would generate 
comparative-advantages in agricultural productions and profitable trade opportunities, 
leading to higher living standards. Of course, these effects were considerably enhanced 
by the discovery of the New World, which also reduced the prospect of famines and 
malnutrition and therefore allowed further population growth. In turn, a larger 
population would increase both the potential returns to entrepreneurial innovation 
(stimulated by a larger market) and the probability that innovation actually takes place 
(higher number of thinking individuals)
12. 
  True enough, many of these elements point to the need to remove legal rents as a 
precondition for growth, which is more or less equivalent to underscoring the need to 
preserve and protect private property rights. Indeed, rent-seeking situations would 
dissolve if those who bring to bear the legal monopoly of violence did not infringe upon 
private property rights.  
  Nevertheless, this avenue of investigation will not be pursued further. The role 
of demography is surely not denied. There is no doubt that densely populated areas are 
more vulnerable to the consequences of bad harvesting and famines and that the scarcity 
                                                 
12 See for instance Jones (1999), who also stressed the importance of enforcing intellectual property 
rights. Indeed, it is not by accident that these were explicitly recognised by legislators in the advanced 
countries of the time: in Venice as early as the XVth century, in the Low Countries and England about a 
hundred years later. It should be added, however, that the real target of the legislation to protect 
intellectual property were not so much free-riding producers, but the Guild system, that de facto regulated 
access to the exploitation and the production of innovation.   
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of good land may have been a frequent threat over long periods in the Middle Ages. But 
these phenomena cannot be seriously taken as a brake on innovation. Indeed, history 
provides plenty of examples where demography has hardly been a problem for 
development. On the other hand, it is true that larger markets encourage producers to 
develop new technologies and reorganise factors so as to satisfy greater demand. Still, 
although the number of potential beneficiaries has certainly influenced the features of 
entrepreneurial activities, these numbers hardly had an impact on whether to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity or not. Transaction costs (transportation), trade policies and, 
more generally, the ability to appropriate the return to entrepreneurship were probably 
far more important. 
  Similarly, a clearly-defined property right structure is definitely preferable to 
regime of arbitrariness, violence and deceit. Its importance for growth is not denied. 
However, as already mentioned in previous paragraphs, this does not imply that 
property rights are a sufficient requirement for economic growth to take place. Nor does 
it imply that there must be some kind of institutional, top-down intervention so as to 
define and assign allegedly welfare-maximising rights. Once again, history provides 
plenty of examples of communities where property rights were fairly clear, where the 
state played a relative minor role, and yet economic development was virtually nil. 
  In a nutshell, searching for appropriate (optimal) property-right structures - 
including regulation - as recipes for development does not take very far, and can 
actually cause considerable harm. More important is the task of identifying the 
historical periods when property rights became important; of understanding why fairly 
similar property right structures and principles for legitimacy led to growth in some 
situations, while they remained more or less irrelevant under different contexts. A good 
part of the answer comes from trade. 
 
Trade 
In ancient times populations that settled in coastal areas and were subject to 
demographic pressure could expand inland. Or they could trade, either with their 
neighbours, or with overseas populations. In many cases the first option was viable: 
coastal populations actually migrated and merged more or less peacefully with inland 
communities. In other situations sea trade was preferred and contributed to the birth of  
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economic systems based on exchange, specialisation. These economies relied heavily on 
responsible individuals, who were willing to take risks and were fully legitimised when 
making significant profits out of their activity.  
By contrast, land proximity meant that comparative advantages offered 
relatively modest rewards to local trade. Exchanges were definitely smaller in quantity 
and entrepreneurship of less importance. The relatively high cost of land transportation 
also induced merchants to trade rather precious and easy-to move goods (gold, silver 
and slaves, for instance). These features probably conveyed the impression that trade 
was to the benefit of the élites only (landowners), rather than of the population at large. 
Hence, entrepreneurs were likely to be less appreciated from a moral viewpoint and the 
wealth of the merchants had not the same legitimacy as that of the warriors (reward to 
valour and courage) or - later on - of the aristocracy (honour and, perhaps more 
questionably, divine will). This difference made envy and expropriation more easily 
acceptable. If so, it is apparent that private property was bound to be increasingly 
vulnerable.  
  In short, before the rise of the so-called Western Civilisation, which more or less 
coincided with the downfall of feudal society, entrepreneurship had an opportunity to 
develop only under rather particular circumstances (sea trading communities). These 
could however easily break down under foreign attack and disappear
13. And even when 
foreign aggression was repelled, more and more resources (and power) had to be 
devoted to a central authority responsible for defence. As a consequence, feelings of 
national, ethnic or even class loyalty became crucial to enhance collective security. 
When collective security and the absence of domestic tensions mattered, the notion of 
self-responsibility turned out to be a privilege, rather than a right. As such, it frequently 
became a prerogative of the recognised rent-seeking classes, i.e. of those who were (and 
                                                 
13 The idea of an invader with a long-term horizon, and therefore interested in enhancing the wealth of the 
occupied territories, does not apply to ancient times for two reasons. First, looting and enslavement was 
the only way for the ruler to remunerate his army and satisfy his clientele. Failure to do so would have 
been more or less the same as losing power. In addition, the ruler’s legitimacy was often questionable. In 
the best case the ruler was supposed to enjoy the favour of the Gods, as witnessed by the various signals 
to that effect that the Gods were to shower on the population. The incumbent ruler was however made 
vulnerable by the godly signals his competitors might claim to their advantage. Surely, polytheism did not 
contribute to simplify matters. Christendom eventually solved both problems. God-to-man 
communication would have one source only (monotheism) and one receiver (or authorised interpreter - 
the Church).  
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are) less prone to develop productive entrepreneurial skills. As a result, 
entrepreneurship in the pre-Christian history was in very short supply (and demand).  
When comparing the lack of development in the ancient world
14 with today’s 
undeveloped countries, at least a couple of elements seem to deserve attention. First, in 
ancient times entrepreneurship was generally constrained by the difficulties to develop 
large-scale mercantile societies and by the critical attitude towards self-responsibility – 
a potential threat to social cohesion and defence capabilities. The role of property rights 
for development could thus be only marginal. In modern undeveloped countries large-
scale entrepreneurship is also discouraged, for it represents a threat to the ruling élites. 
In particular, trade is allowed only locally, whereas those who want to engage in long-
distance transactions are more or less obliged to fall prey of state-run or state-controlled 
intermediaries. As consequence, trade fails to develop and producers miss all the 
information that goes with it
15: about new products, undetected needs, unknown 
promising markets, new technologies and equipment. Producers who are indeed 
successful beyond the local boundaries are those who have come to compromise with 
the state agencies. Hence the very notion of entrepreneurship is undermined, for success 
tends to be regarded as the result of privilege, rather than of entrepreneurial talent. Once 
again, the lack of secure property (private) rights is the consequence, rather than the 
cause.  
One might thus conclude that in ancient societies mercantile economies failed to 
develop because of the short-term horizon of the rulers, and because of high transaction 
costs (transportation), which made it difficult to reap the advantages of specialisation. It 
would also be tempting to add that since today the latter costs are a fraction of what they 
used to be, the introduction of democracy and the elimination of rent-seeking autocrats 
would be sufficient conditions to revive entrepreneurship, since it would automatically 
lead to adequate property right structures (rule of law). Although presented in slightly 
                                                 
14 For the purpose of this paper, ‘pre-Christian history’ and the ‘ancient world’ extends approximately 
until the XIIIth century, when the new religion ceased to affect vast layers of the population and 
productive entrepreneurship in Western Europe spread with sizeable results.  
15 As underlined in Bauer (1991), trade is the engine of entrepreneurship, for it enhances the transfer of 
knowledge and creates opportunities for new ventures.   
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different terms, this is actually the core of most current development policies. 
Unfortunately, this conclusion misses the point and runs against facts
16.  
 
Politicisation and lack of responsibility instead of property rights 
Indeed, the difference between the undeveloped world and the beginning of Western 
economic growth is not just a matter of lower transportation cost and a huge in 
expansion in the technology frontier attainable. Today’s societies are also featuring a 
much higher degree of politicisation and democratisation. As forcefully explained in 
Bauer (1991) and Hoppe (2001), politicisation implies that an increasingly large number 
of individuals believe that the solution to poverty has to be provided by the political 
context (better constitutional rules, better policy-making, fair property-right rules); 
rather than by the creation of a suitable entrepreneurial environment that allows 
individual to strive in order to enhance their own welfare
17. Politicisation is of course 
attractive, for it offers ready-made solutions, and diverts attention from the painstaking 
analysis of the mechanisms that should lead to solutions. A recent example is provided 
by Serbia, where most intellectuals believed that the only cause for the country’s 
backwardness was President Milosevic, so that by removing the tyrant the Serbian 
economy would blossom with no further action. Instead, the logics of democratic 
politicisation usually opens up the race to power. Sometimes candidates compete 
peacefully, especially when the median voter has a lot to lose (high income or wealth) 
and not much to gain (discretionary power is effectively limited or dispersed). In other 
cases competition leads to violence, when most of the population has little to lose and 
much to gain (the winning faction often enjoys virtually unlimited discretionary power). 
It is then hardly surprising that many countries prefer to avoid democratic rules, and go 
for illiberal autocracies, as long these can limit conflict and violence. Even at the 
                                                 
16 On the one hand, the correlation between political regimes and growth is tenuous at best. On the other, 
many autocrats are voted into power through fair elections, and often confirmed to power. In most cases 
opposition comes from other would-be autocrats, rather than by candidates offering democratic rule.  
17 That also includes decisions about investment in equipment and human capital. The presence of 
allegedly imperfect capital markets is hardly an issue, for local savings are often adequate to finance the 
investments required. History shows that Western Europe in the Middle Ages started to invest with no 
support from Venus or Mars. More recently Barro (1999) has shown that inequality in income distribution 
bears no effect on savings, which is to say that the propensity to save does not depend on income. As 
regards human capital, Carneiro and Heckman (2003) provide evidence showing that education depends 
on family ethics and the opportunities for talent to emerge and be rewarded; much less on government 
programs.   
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expense of growth. Despite common beliefs, the key to development then seems to be 
less politicisation and possibly less democracy, too. Singapore and Hong Kong would 
of course be fitting examples.  
Another element is the role of self-responsibility. In ancient times this was not 
an issue for a large part of the population. It was more relevant for the free men and the 
élites, but did not lead to significant results, for such results became possible only when 
self-responsibility was accompanied by entrepreneurship
18. Prior to that, self-
responsibility for the middle-class free man was only applied to his interaction within 
the local community. The notion of self-responsibility was surely present, since 
individuals were supposed to behave in the interest of the community and were 
punished for not doing so. Similarly, they were responsible for complying with the 
agreements the community had established with other communities. But it is clear that 
the informal rules of the game in most of those societies were mainly ‘defensive’, in that 
they were aiming at consolidating the status quo as a guarantee for social cohesion, 
rather than at promoting talent and experimentation on a wide scale. Despite this 
weakness, however, the ancient world actually offered a somewhat more promising 
picture, compared with today’s low-income countries. For ancient societies did not 
dispute the principle of human dignity; they rather disputed the question of who could 
be defined ‘human’
19. As a matter of fact, ancient society turned into Western 
Civilization (i.e. growth, from an economic viewpoint) when human dignity became a 
universal notion and entrepreneurship acquired moral recognition
20.  
On the other hand, in the last decades politicisation has weakened the notion of 
self-responsibility, both in the developed and the undeveloped world. And the notion of 
democracy has favoured the concept of coercive solidarity, which is taken as a duty for 
some, as a right for others. Hence, if one takes an optimistic view, one could claim that 
it will not take centuries to go from backwardness to economic progress: information 
and transportation costs are low, the technological knowledge available is astonishing, 
                                                 
18 Of course, the underlying assumption is that self-responsibility is a necessary condition to obtain 
(productive) entrepreneurship, but not sufficient. 
19 As a matter of fact, this side of the question did not disappear very quickly. As late as the XVIth 
century the Church never took a strong position against those who justified deportation and slavery by 
claiming that African blacks and South-American Indios had no soul, and that therefore the rights of 
human dignity did not apply to them. 
20 See also Sirico (2000).  
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imitation effects are likely to be sizeable. A more cautious approach would perhaps 
suggest that today’s problem is not about widening and integrating a well-established 
subjectivist view of social interaction (as shown by the transition from the classical to 
the Western civilisations). Instead, it is about transforming hopes for utopian, third-way 
solutions - presumably provided by a new and better class of enlightened politicians - 
into greater consciousness of the rent-seeking implications of collective decision-
making processes. Somewhat paradoxically, the chances for this to happen are greater in 
those areas where the influence of the welfare-state culture is weaker. From such a 
standpoint, one could actually go further and claim that Westernization is the most 
dangerous enemy to development, more so than autocratic political institutions or the 
lack of rule of law.    
 
Ideology 
The previous pages have suggested that the development of effective property right 
structures depends on the notions of entrepreneurship and self-responsibility. 
Individuals’ attitudes and states of mind heavily influence these concepts. Hence, the 
notions of economic progress and individual satisfaction cannot be fully understood 
unless the area of shared ideologies is properly investigated, i.e. unless the set of shared 
moral standards that provide legitimacy to human action is appreciated. One may 
certainly welcome all attempts to suggest a history of ideologies, which is actually 
equivalent to suggesting a history of the dynamics of a civilization. Among others, 
Spengler, Toynbee, Hicks and Quigley are celebrated examples. Unfortunately, if one 
abandons the safe avenues of description, the risk of falling into the traps of social 
determinism is almost unavoidable.  
By contrast, a more fruitful approach consists of looking at the source of 
ideologies, studying how the legitimacy of individual action is determined, how it 
evolves, and under which circumstances the existing principles of legitimacy can be 
replaced by new criteria. From this viewpoint, if a civilisation is identified as a system 
of admissible behavioural rules, then property-right regimes and outcomes reflect both 
such rules and the environmental features (including geography) with which they 
interact.   
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Now, during the history of man the sources of rules legitimacy have been either 
external or internal to human kind
21. In the former case the norms for social behaviour 
(morality) come from one or more divinities, who dictate the rules of the game. The 
power of a secular ruler is then legitimate as long as he proves that he has actually been 
designated by God and that he has not betrayed the implicit pact of obedience to comply 
with and apply divine rule (call it good government). As we know, this structure of 
legitimacy provides an effective constraint upon the abuse of power and is therefore a 
powerful contribution to social stability, as long as divine designation remains 
unquestioned and the pact of obedience is clearly specified and understood by the 
population.  
The other source of legitimacy is man as such, as the Enlightenment has 
asserted. In this case the bond between religion and morality is de facto eliminated, and 
therefore that between religion and power (De Jouvenel [1945] 1993). Man himself 
defines the relevant rules, which may be the outcome of a more or less well conceived 
social order (as the constructivist legacy of the French Enlightenment would suggest) or 
the outcome of spontaneous interactions among free man (as the Scottish Enlightenment 
has claimed). Under both circumstances, however, the ruler no longer is the secular 
executor of divine will, but either the interpreter and executor of the alleged social 
contract that underlies the agreed-upon enlightened social design; or the protector of 
individual freedom.   
It has been previously argued that a winning civilisation, i.e. a society that 
survives its inevitable inner tensions
22 and provides opportunity for economic progress, 
is one where the principle of self-responsibility prevails and productive entrepreneurial 
talents are rewarded by those who benefit from them. By taking account the various 
points suggested so far, the key questions that development economics should then 
address are thus the following. Can a supposedly optimally-designed society satisfy the 
two requirements just mentioned? If not, what system of legitimacy does? Where do 
                                                 
21 One area of potential ambiguity must be conceded, though. That applies to the case of animism, 
whereby one cannot claim that man is his own master except for the rules that discipline his interaction 
with other men. Nor can one claim that these rules come from one or more clearly identified divine 
authorities. 
22 Tensions can be explained by the fact that individuals may share the same broad values, apply them in 
different ways, so that temptations to deviate from recognised ethical standards are sometimes hard to 
resist.   
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undeveloped economies currently stand? And what are the chances for them to move 
from one system to the other? Even if instructive, lack of space does not allow close 
scrutiny of past historical experiences so as to shed light on the elements that shaped 
successful dynamics both across and within civilisations. The last part of this paper will 
however attempt to highlight some elements concerning today’s undeveloped 
economies.  
 
Back to the Economics of Development – Culture or Rules? 
The search for an optimally-designed property-right structure is indeed the core of state-
of-the-art development economics, as taught in the classroom and presumably applied 
by government and international agencies, including the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. 
 
Constructivism once again 
By extending the discussion proposed in the previous paragraphs, it is manifest that 
constructivism per se cannot solve the problem of slow economic progress. As a matter 
of fact, it can make it worse. For the very acceptance of a constructivist approach 
implies that both the design of the rules and their subsequent interpretations are subject 
to human discretion. And that the decision about those in charge and about how far their 
discretion should go is to be defined through the political process. For understandable 
reasons the mechanism that is likely to prevail is the one which maximises consensus 
(democracy). Not surprisingly, the rule-making game is then a mix of rent-seeking 
interests and redistributive pressures
23. Such an environment is hardly conducive to 
growth.  
This leads to the essence of the poverty trap, which of course has little or 
nothing to do with the so-called savings and human-capital gaps. As has been 
mentioned earlier on, when people with little to lose compete for power, they also have 
                                                 
23 Indeed, this problem was not totally overlooked even by some authors of the French Enlightenment, 
such as Rousseau, who actually claimed that the people at large are not wise enough to decide, so that a 
democratic voting procedure would have been inappropriate. The lessons was well taken by the leaders of 
the French Revolution, who therefore felt authorised to interpret the needs of the people whatever their 
desires might have been, and actually introduced oligarchic rule first, tyranny later. Especially in the 
West, XXth century politicians chose to ignore that lesson.  
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little restraint in transforming peaceful confrontation into violent conflicts. Such 
conflicts are often described as clashes among different religious or ethnic groups. 
These explanations certainly contain some truth, but they are only part of the story. For 
the real question remains the acquisition of unrestricted power, an area where self-
responsibility, entrepreneurship and concern for property-right enforcement play a very 
modest role, if at all. Indeed, when it comes to the race to power among competing 
pressure groups, teamwork and loyalty to the coalition weigh more than responsibility 
and accountability. And those who better than others succeed in relieving people from 
individual responsibilities and in lieu promise redistribution through rent-seeking 
positions (sometimes disguised as ‘social rights’) acquire group leadership. 
Furthermore, since the rewards to unproductive entrepreneurs are greater than those 
obtained by means of productive entrepreneurship, it is hardly surprising that making 
money by using talent is seldom regarded as an honourable activity. For envy often 
leads people to associate somebody else’s success with unfair behaviour, even when 
that is not the case.  
Under these circumstances private property rights are hardly protected and 
contract scarcely enforced. But that account can be no basis for policy, for it amounts to 
arguing that constructivism has failed because it has not been enforced or because there 
was not enough of it. Once one accepts the constructivist criterion, the possibility of 
introducing rule of law in a developing country is seriously compromised. The heart of 
the matter is that there is no demand for a better property rights structure and most feel 
justified in adjusting to the prevailing moral environment, including rent-seeking 
malpractices. To this point is devoted the final paragraph of this article. 
 
Legitimacy and development 
According to the argument developed so far, the so-called poverty trap of an 
undeveloped economy is in fact a legitimacy gap, whereby any kind of political leader 
or élite develops a short-term horizon and feels no restraints in his/her race to power. In 
the end, in these countries formal democracies and formal autocracies do not differ 
much. Contrary to what has been argued by some institutional economists (such as 
Olson, 1993), a modern democracy is not necessarily more encompassing than an  
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autocratic regime
24, for both regimes suffer from the shortcomings of little 
accountability and from the need to redistribute resources to clienteles.  
  It is therefore not surprising that public choice scholars as well as institutional 
authors are somewhat uncomfortable in explaining the birth of an autocracy and then 
the transition from autocracy to democracy. Indeed, even a cursory look at the literature 
shows that in order to escape determinism they have to fall back on residual solutions
25 
or accidents (exogenous shocks), which is of course hardly satisfactory. 
  History shows that growth in the West took place when the issue was not about 
moving from an institutional environment to another, but from an ideological system to 
another, i.e. from one set of sources for legitimacy to another. At the beginning, 
transition was fouded on a unique source of divine legitimacy (the Emperor) to multiple 
and often times competing representatives of the divine will – the monarch, the 
aristocracy, the Church. In some cases an oligarchy of learned men also entered the 
field, thereby advocating the right of the individual to assess the actual meaning of 
religious obedience, its political consequences and thus enforcing rulers’ accountability 
(Humanism). Contrary - say - to the Islamic world
26, this evolution took place in the 
West during the Middle Ages. Sometimes it was successful (Northern Italy, the Low 
Countries), sometimes it almost failed (Spain) or brought about mixed results (France, 
England).  
Later on two other key passages took place, under the influence of French 
Enlightenment (and of the French Revolution) and of Romantic Darwinism (leading to 
the First World War). These caused a reduction in political competition and encouraged 
constructivism; but they took place at a moment when the power of economic progress 
had already been unleashed, living standards were already high enough to discourage 
systematic violent confrontation within each country. More important, the winning 
coalitions had already established and legitimised themselves as guarantors of enough 
redistribution to ensure the so-called social peace.  
                                                 
24 The very fact that growth seems to independent of the political regime supports this statement. See for 
instance Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe (1999) for a survey of the literature.  
25 For instance, Olson (1993) posits that democracy comes to the surface when competing autocrats face 
stalemate after prolonged fighting and eventually choose a cooperative solution.  
26 See for instance Labohm (2003).  
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  Unfortunately, none of this can be claimed for today’s undeveloped world, 
where the pursuit of rents and policy-making power is assuaged neither by shared moral 
standard (legitimacy), nor by consolidated coalitions looking for consensus, even if at 
the expense of a suitable property right regime and thus growth. Hence, there is no 
particular reason to believe that the introduction of Western constructivist ideologies 
will generate much economic progress. It is certainly true that the Western ‘rule of law’ 
and property right enforcement systems are highly correlated with high incomes. But 
Western wealth has been created thanks to an ideological environment that is no longer 
there. And nowadays much of Western governance structures are designed to stabilise 
the distribution of that wealth among interest groups and meet both competitive 
pressures and envy; rather than to enhance the creation of new sources of prosperity. By 
inducing developing countries to accept such governance structures, Western well-
meaning social engineers would induce the undeveloped world to concentrate on - and 
fight for - fragments of income, with little concern for the creation of new wealth. 
Under such circumstances, a heap of desirable constitutions would assign and define 
more or less questionable rights over very little property.  
It thus appears that the best chances for the protection and enforcement of 
property rights are enjoyed by those countries where an established autocracy draws its 
legitimacy from its ability to abstain from excessive intervention and to restore dignity 
to productive entrepreneurship. Only later will this lead to a demand for formal 
property-right structures and more effective enforcement. Surely, sooner or later, 
pressure for redistribution will also rise and lead to possible political crises, especially if 
growth loses momentum. If pressure comes too early, property rights would be violated 
and economic progress would come to a standstill, if class or ethnic ideologies prevail 
and large groups have little to lose from violent confrontation. Otherwise, growth will 
slow down quietly and the catching-up dynamics will come to an end.  
Surely, the Western model may also be rejected, as it appears to be the case in 
many European countries, where youth are rapidly losing interest in political 
engineering and, indeed, in politics as a whole. If so, there are reasons for hope. 
Although the illusion of the welfare state still has many adepts - even among the young 
- the wind of globalisation may soon prove too hard to resist. It might encourage  
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individuals to go back to the liberal cornerstones of Middle-Age Western Europe and 
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